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Abstract
We study the problem of differentially private optimization with linear constraints when
the right-hand-side of the constraints depends on private data. This type of problem appears
in many applications, especially resource allocation. Previous research provided solutions that
retained privacy, but sometimes violated the constraints. In many settings, however, the con-
straints cannot be violated under any circumstances. To address this hard requirement, we
present an algorithm that releases a nearly-optimal solution satisfying the problem’s constraints
with probability 1. We also prove a lower bound demonstrating that the difference between the
objective value of our algorithm’s solution and the optimal solution is tight up to logarithmic
factors among all differentially private algorithms. We conclude with experiments on real and
synthetic datasets demonstrating that our algorithm can achieve nearly optimal performance
while preserving privacy.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [5] has emerged as the standard for reasoning about user privacy and private
computations. A myriad of practical algorithms exist for a broad range of specific problems. We
can now solve tasks in a private manner ranging from computing simple dataset statistics [17] to
modern machine learning [1]. In this work we add to this body of research by tackling a fundamental
question of constrained optimization.
Specifically, we study optimization problems with linear constraints and Lipschitz objective
functions. This family of optimization problems includes linear programming and quadratic pro-
gramming with linear constraints, which can be used to formulate diverse problems in computer
science, as well as other fields such as engineering, manufacturing, and transportation. Resource
allocation is an example of a common problem in this family: given multiple agents competing for
limited goods, how should the goods be distributed among the agents? Whether assigning jobs
to machines or partitioning network bandwidth among different applications, these problems have
convex optimization formulations with linear constraints. Given that the input to these problems
may come from private user data, it is imperative that we find solutions that do not leak information
about any individual.
Formally, the goal in linearly-constrained optimization is to find a vector x maximizing a func-
tion g(x) subject to the constraint that Ax ≤ b. Due in part to the breadth of the problems
covered by these approaches, the past several decades have seen the development of a variety of op-
timization algorithms with provable guarantees, as well as fast commercial solvers. The parameters
A and b encode data about the specific problem instance at hand, and it is easy to come up with
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minimize
∑
i,j cijxij
such that
∑N
j=1 xij ≤ si ∀i ∈ [M ]∑M
i=1 xij ≥ rj ∀j ∈ [N ]
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [M ],∀j ∈ [N ].
Figure 1: The transportation problem formulated as a linear program. There are N hospital
branches and M pharmacies. Each branch j requires rj units of a specific drug. These values are
sensitive because they reveal the number of people at each branch with a specific disease. Each
pharmacy i has a supply of si units. It costs cij dollars to transport a unit of the drug from
pharmacy i to hospital j. We use the notation xij to denote the units of the drug transported from
pharmacy i to hospital j.
instances where simply releasing the optimal solution would leak information about this sensitive
data.
As a concrete example, suppose there is a hospital with branches located throughout a state,
each of which has a number of patients with a certain disease. A specific drug is required to treat the
infected patients, which the hospital can obtain from a set of pharmacies. The goal is to determine
which pharmacies should supply which hospital branches while minimizing the transportation cost.
In Figure 1, we present this problem as a linear program (LP). The LP is defined by sensitive
information: the constraint vector reveals the number of patients with the disease at each branch.
We provide tools with provable guarantees for solving linearly-constrained optimization prob-
lems while preserving differential privacy (DP) [5]. Our algorithm applies to the setting where the
constraint vector b depends on private data, as is the case in many resource allocation problems,
such as the transportation problem above. This problem falls in the category of private optimiza-
tion, for which there are multiple algorithms in the unconstrained case [2, 4, 12]. To the best of our
knowledge, only Hsu et al. [10] study differentially private linear programming—a special case of
linearly-constrained optimization. They allow their algorithm’s output to violate the constraints,
which can be unacceptable in many applications. In our transportation example from Figure 1, if
the constraints are violated, then some hospital will not receive the drugs they require, or some
pharmacy will be asked to supply more drugs than they have in their inventory. The importance
of satisfying constraints motivates this paper’s central question:
How can we privately solve optimization problems while ensuring that no constraint is
violated?
1.1 Results overview
Formally, our goal is to privately solve optimization problems of the form
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} ,
where the function g is L-Lipschitz and b(D) ∈ Rm depends on a private database D. The database
is a set of individuals’ records, each of which is an element of a domain X .
To solve this problem, our (, δ)-differentially private algorithm maps b(D) to a nearby vector
b¯(D) and releases the vector maximizing g(x) such that Ax ≤ b¯(D). (We assume g is efficiently
optimizable under linear constraints, which is the case, for example, when g is convex.) We ensure
that b¯(D) ≤ b(D) coordinate-wise, and therefore our algorithm’s output satisfies the constraints.
This requirement precludes our use of traditional DP mechanisms: perturbing each component of
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b(D) using the Laplace, Gaussian, or exponential mechanisms would not result in a vector that
is component-wise smaller than b(D). Instead, we extend the truncated Laplace mechanism to a
multi-dimensional setting.
We provide a utility bound on the quality of the solution, proving that if x(D) ∈ Rn is our algo-
rithm’s output and x∗ is the optimal solution to the original optimization problem, then g(x(D))
is close to g (x∗). Our bound depends on the sensitivity ∆ of the vector b(D), which equals the
maximum `1-norm between any two vectors b(D) and b(D
′) when D and D′ are neighboring, in the
sense that D and D′ differ on at most one individual’s data. Our bound also depends on the “nice-
ness” of the matrix A, which we quantify using the condition number α(A) of the linear system1
[13, 14]. We summarize our upper bound below (see Theorem 3.6 for the complete statement).
Theorem 1.1 (Simplified upper bound). With probability 1,
g (x∗)− g(x(D)) ≤ 2 ·∆ · L · α(A)

ln
(
m (e − 1)
δ
+ 1
)
. (1)
Our main contribution is to show that our proposed algorithm is nearly optimal. We provide a
lower bound that is tight up to a logarithmic factor as we summarize below.
Theorem 1.2 (Simplified lower bound). There exists an infinite family of matrices A ∈ Rm×m, a
1-Lipschitz function g : Rm → R, and a mapping from databases D ⊆ X to vectors b(D) ∈ Rm for
any ∆ > 0 such that:
1. The sensitivity of b(D) equals ∆, and
2. For any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2], if µ is an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism such that
Aµ(D) ≤ b(D) with probability 1, then
g(x∗)− E[g(µ(D))] ≥ ∆ · α(A)
4
ln
(
e − 1
2δ
+ 1
)
.
This lower bound matches the upper bound from Equation (1) up to a multiplicative factor of
O(lnm). See Theorem 3.9 for the complete statement.
Pure differential privacy. A natural question is whether we can achieve pure (, 0)-differential
privacy. In Section 4, we prove that if S∗ :=
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)}—the intersection of the
feasible regions across all databases D—is nonempty, then the optimal (, 0)-differentially private
mechanism disregards the database D and outputs argmaxx∈S∗g(x) with probability 1. If S∗ = ∅,
then no (, 0)-differentially private mechanism exists. Therefore, any non-trivial private mechanism
must allow for a failure probability δ > 0.
Experiments. We empirically evaluate our algorithm in the contexts of financial portfolio op-
timization and internet advertising. Our experiments show that our algorithm can achieve nearly
optimal performance while preserving privacy. We also compare our algorithm to a baseline (, 0)-
differentially private mechanism that is allowed to violate the problem’s constraints. Our experi-
ments demonstrate that for small values of the privacy parameter , using the baseline algorithm
yields a large number of violated constraints, while using our algorithm violates no constraints and
incurs virtually no loss in revenue.
1Here, we use the simplified notation α(A) = infp≥1 {αp,q(A) p√m}, where αp,q(A) is defined in Section 3 and ‖·‖q
is the `q-norm under which the objective function g is L-Lipschitz.
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1.2 Additional related research
Truncated Laplace mechanism. Geng et al. [8] also study the truncated Laplace mechanism in
a one-dimensional setting. Given a query q mapping from databasesD to R, they study query-output
independent noise-adding (QIN) algorithms. Each such algorithm µ is defined by a distribution
P over R. It releases the query output q(D) perturbed by additive random noise X ∼ P , i.e.,
µ(D) = q(D) + X. They provide upper and lower bounds on the expected noise magnitude |X|
of any QIN algorithm, the upper bound equaling the expected noise magnitude of the truncated
Laplace mechanism. They show that in the limit as the privacy parameters  and δ converge to
zero, these upper and lower bounds converge.
The Laplace mechanism is known to be a nearly optimal, general purpose (, 0)-DP mechanism.
While other task-specific mechanisms can surpass the utility of the Laplace mechanism [7], they all
induce distributions with exponentially decaying tails. The optimality of these mechanisms comes
from the fact that the ratio between the mechanism’s output distributions for any two neighboring
databases is exactly exp(). Adding less noise would fail to maintain that ratio everywhere, while
adding more noise would distort the query output more than necessary. Geng et al. [8] observe
that, in the case of (, δ)-DP mechanisms, adding large magnitude, low probability noise is wasteful,
since the DP criteria can instead be satisfied using the δ “budget” rather than maintaining the
exp() ratio everywhere. To solve our private optimization problem, we shift and add noise to the
constraints, and in our case adding large magnitude, low probability noise is not only wasteful but
violates our requirement that the constraints must be satisfied with probability 1.
Given their similar characterizations, it is not surprising that our mechanism is closely related
to that of Geng et al. [8]—the mechanisms both draw noise from a truncated Laplace distribution.
Our problem, however, is multidimensional and therefore extra care must be taken in how much
noise we add to each coordinate. Moreover, the proof of our mechanism’s optimality is stronger in
several ways. First, it holds for any differentially private algorithm, not just for the limited class of
QIN algorithms. Second, in the one-dimensional setting (m = 1)—which is the setting that Geng
et al. [8] analyze—our lower bound matches our algorithm’s upper bound up to a constant factor
of 8 for any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2], not only in the limit as  and δ converge to zero.
Differentially private combinatorial optimization. Several recent works have studied differ-
entially private combinatorial optimization [9, 11], which is a distinct problem from ours, since most
combinatorial optimization problems cannot be formulated only using linear constraints. Hsu et al.
[11] specifically study a private variant of a classic allocation problem: there are n agents and k
goods, and the agents’ values for all 2k bundles of the goods are private. The goal is to allocate the
goods among the agents in order to maximize social welfare, while maintaining differential privacy.
This is similar but distinct from the transportation problem from Figure 1. Indeed, if we were to
follow the formulation from Hsu et al. [11], the transportation costs would be private, whereas in
our setting, the transportation costs are public but the total demand of each hospital is private.
2 Differential privacy definition
To define differential privacy (DP), we first formally introduce the notion of a neighboring database:
two databases D,D′ ⊆ X are neighboring, denoted D ∼ D′, if they differ on any one record
(|D ∆ D′| = 1). We use the notation x(D) ∈ Rn to denote the random variable corresponding to
the vector that our algorithm releases (non-trivial DP algorithms are, by necessity, randomized).
Given privacy parameters  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], the algorithm satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy
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((, δ)-DP) if for any neighboring databases D,D′ and any subset V ⊆ Rn,
Pr[x(D) ∈ V ] ≤ e Pr[x(D′) ∈ V ] + δ.
3 Multi-dimensional optimization
Our goal is to privately solve multi-dimensional optimization problems of the form
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} , (2)
where b(D) = (b(D)1, . . . , b(D)m) is a vector in Rm and g is an L-Lipschitz function according to
an `q-norm || · ||q for q ≥ 1. Preserving differential privacy while ensuring the constraints are always
satisfied is impossible if the feasible regions change drastically across databases. For example, if D
and D′ are neighboring databases with disjoint feasible regions, there is no (, δ)-DP mechanism
that always satisfies the constraints with δ < 1 (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A). To circumvent this
impossibility, we assume that the intersection of the feasible regions across databases is nonempty.
This is satisfied, for example, if the origin is always feasible.
Assumption 3.1. The set S∗ :=
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} is non-empty.
In our approach, we map each vector b(D) to a random variable b¯(D) ∈ Rm and release
x(D) ∈ argmaxx∈Rn
{
g(x) : Ax ≤ b¯(D)} . (3)
To formally describe our approach, we use the notation ∆ = maxD∼D′ ‖b(D)− b(D′)‖1 to de-
note the constraint vector’s sensitivity. We define the ith component of b¯(D) to be b¯(D)i =
max {b(D)i − s+ ηi, b∗i } , where s = ∆ ln
(
m(e−1)
δ + 1
)
, ηi is drawn from the truncated Laplace
distribution with support [−s, s] and scale ∆ , and b∗i = infD {b(D)i}. In Lemmas A.2 and A.3 in
Appendix A, we prove that S∗ = {x : Ax ≤ (b∗1, . . . , b∗m)} , which allows us to prove that Equa-
tion (3) is feasible. In Section 3.1, we prove that our algorithm preserves differential privacy and
in Section 3.2, we bound our algorithm’s loss.
3.1 Privacy guarantee
In this section, we prove that our algorithm satisfies differential privacy. We use the notation η =
(η1, . . . , ηm) to denote a random vector where each component is drawn i.i.d. from the truncated
Laplace distribution with support [−s, s] and scale ∆ . We also use the notation b(D) − s + η =
(b(D)1 − s+ η1, . . . , b(D)m − s+ ηm).
Theorem 3.2. The mapping D 7→ b(D)− s+ η preserves (, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Let D and D′ be two neighboring databases. We write the density function of b(D)− s+η
as fD(u) ∝
∏m
i=1 exp
(
− |ui+s−b(D)i|∆
)
when u ∈ [b(D) − 2s, b(D)] and fD(u) = 0 when u 6∈
[b(D)− 2s, b(D)]. This proof relies on the following two claims. The first claim shows that in the
intersection of the supports [b(D) − 2s, b(D)] ∩ [b(D′) − 2s, b(D′)], the density functions fD and
fD′ are close. The proof is in Appendix A.
Claim 3.3. Let u be a vector in the intersection of the supports [b(D)−2s, b(D)]∩[b(D′)−2s, b(D′)].
Then fD(u) ≤ efD′(u).
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The second claim shows that the total density of b(D)− s+ η on vectors not contained in the
support of b(D′)− s+ η is at most δ.
Claim 3.4. Let V = [b(D) − 2s, b(D)] \ [b(D′) − 2s, b(D′)] be the set of vectors in the support of
b(D)− s+ η but not in the support of b(D′)− s+ η. Then Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈ V ] ≤ δ.
Proof of Claim 3.4. Suppose b(D) − s + η ∈ V . Then for some i ∈ [m], either b(D)i − s + ηi <
b(D′)i − 2s or b(D)i − s + ηi > b(D′)i. This implies that either ηi < −s + ∆ or ηi > s −∆. The
density function of the truncated Laplace distribution with support [−s, s] and scale ∆ is
f(η) =
{
1
Z exp
(
− |η|∆
)
if η ∈ [−s, s]
0 otherwise,
where Z =
2∆(1−e−s/∆)
 is a normalizing constant. Therefore, the probability that for some i ∈ [m],
either ηi < −s+ ∆ or ηi > s−∆ is
m
(∫ −s+∆
−s
f(η) dη +
∫ s
s−∆
f(η) dη
)
=
m
Z
(∫ −s+∆
−s
exp
(
−|η|
∆
)
dη +
∫ s
s−∆
exp
(
−|η|
∆
)
dη
)
=
2m∆(e − 1)e−s/∆
Z
=
m (e − 1) e−s/∆
1− e−s/∆
=
m (e − 1)
es/∆ − 1
= δ,
where the final equality follows from the fact that s = ∆ ln
(
m(e−1)
δ + 1
)
. In turn, this implies
that Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈ V ] ≤ δ.
These two claims imply that the mapping D 7→ b(D)−s+η preserves (, δ)-differential privacy.
To see why, let W ⊆ [b(D)−2s, b(D)] be an arbitrary set of vectors in the support of b(D)− s+η.
Let W0 = W ∩ [b(D′) − 2s, b(D′)] be the set of vectors in W that are also in the support of
b(D′) − s + η and let W1 = W \ [b(D′) − 2s, b(D′)] be the remaining set of vectors in W . As in
Claim 3.4, let V = [b(D) − 2s, b(D)] \ [b(D′) − 2s, b(D′)] be the set of vectors in the support of
b(D)− s+ η but not in the support of b(D′)− s+ η. Clearly, W1 ⊆ V . Therefore,
Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈W ] = Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈W0] + Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈W1]
≤ Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈W0] + Pr[b(D)− s+ η ∈ V ]
=
∫
W0
fD(u) du+
∫
V
fD(u) du
≤
∫
W0
efD′(u) du+
∫
V
fD(u) du (Claim 3.3)
≤
∫
W0
efD′(u) du+ δ (Claim 3.4)
≤ e Pr[b(D′)− s+ η ∈W ] + δ,
so differential privacy is preserved.
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Since differential privacy is immune to post-processing [6], Theorem 3.2 implies our algorithm
is differentially private.
Corollary 3.5. The mapping D 7→ x(D) is (, δ)-differentially private.
3.2 Quality guarantees
We next provide a bound on the quality of our algorithm, which measures the difference between
the optimal solution maxx∈Rn {g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} and the solution our algorithm returns g(x(D)).
Our quality guarantee depends on the “niceness” of the matrix A, as quantified by the linear
system’s condition number [13], denoted αp,q(A). Li [13] proved that this value sharply characterizes
the extent to which a change in the vector b causes a change in the feasible region, so it makes
sense that it appears in our quality guarantees. Given a norm || · ||p on Rm where p ≥ 1, we use the
notation || · ||p∗ to denote the dual norm where 1p + 1p∗ = 1. The linear system’s condition number
is defined as
αp,q(A) = sup
{
‖u‖p∗ :
∥∥ATu∥∥
q∗ = 1,u ≥ 0, and the rows of A corresponding
to the nonzero entries of u are linearly independent
}
.
When A is nonsingular and p = q = 2, αp,q(A) is at most the inverse of the minimum singular
value, σmin(A)
−1. This value σmin(A)−1 is closely related to the matrix A’s condition number
(which is distinct from αp,q(A), the linear system’s condition number), which roughly measures the
rate at which the solution to Ax = b changes with respect to a change in b.
We now prove our quality guarantee, which bounds the difference between the optimal solution
to the original optimization problem (Equation (2)) and that of the privately transformed problem
(Equation (3)).
Theorem 3.6. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds and the function g : Rn → R is L-Lipschitz with
respect to an `q-norm ‖·‖q on Rn. With probability 1,
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} − g(x(D)) ≤ 2L∆

· inf
p≥1
{
αp,q(A)
p
√
m
} · ln(m (e − 1)
δ
+ 1
)
.
Proof. Let b be an arbitrary vector in the support of b¯(D) and let S = {x : Ax ≤ b}. Let x∗ be
an arbitrary point in argmaxx∈Rn {g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} and let x¯ be an arbitrary vector in S. We
know that
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} − max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b} = g(x∗)− max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b}
= g(x∗)− g(x¯) + g(x¯)− max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b} .
Since x¯ ∈ S = {x : Ax ≤ b}, we know that g(x¯) ≤ maxx∈Rn {g(x) : Ax ≤ b} . Therefore,
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} − max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b} ≤ g(x∗)− g(x¯) ≤ L · ‖x∗ − x¯‖q . (4)
Let M = g(x∗)−max{g(x) : Ax ≤ b}. Equation (4) shows that for every x¯ ∈ S, ML ≤ ‖x∗ − x¯‖q.
Meanwhile, from work by Li [13], we know that for any `p-norm ‖·‖p,
inf
x¯∈S
‖x∗ − x¯‖q ≤ αp,q(A) · ‖b(D)− b‖p . (5)
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By definition of the infimum, this means that M ≤ L ·αp,q(A) · ‖b(D)− b‖p . This inequality holds
for any vector b in the support of b¯(D) and with probability 1,∥∥b(D)− b¯(D)∥∥
p
≤ 2∆
p
√
m

ln
(
m (e − 1)
δ
+ 1
)
.
Therefore, the theorem holds.
In the following examples, we instantiate Theorem 3.6 in several specific settings.
Example 3.7 (Nonsingular constraint matrix). When A is nonsingular, setting ‖·‖p = ‖·‖q = ‖·‖2
implies that
max
x∈Rn
{g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} − g(x(D)) ≤ 2 ·∆ ·
√
m · L
 · σmin(A) ln
(
m (e − 1)
δ
+ 1
)
.
Example 3.8 (Strongly stable linear inequalities). We can obtain even stronger guarantees when
the system of inequalities Ax < 0 has a solution. In that case, the set {x : Ax ≤ b} is non-empty
for any vector b [15], so we need not make Assumption 3.1. Moreover, when ‖·‖q and ‖·‖p both
equal the `∞-norm and Ax < 0 has a solution, we can replace αp,q(A) in Theorem 3.6 with the
following solution to a linear program:
α¯(A) = max
(u,z)∈Rm+n
{
1 · u : −z ≤ u>A ≤ z,u ≥ 0, and 1 · z = 1
}
.
This is because we can replace Equation (5) with inf x¯∈S ‖x∗ − x¯‖q ≤ α¯(A) · ‖b(D)− b‖p [15].
In the following theorem, we prove that the quality guarantee from Theorem 3.6 is tight up to
a factor of O(logm).
Theorem 3.9. Let A ∈ Rm×m be an arbitrary diagonal matrix with positive diagonal entries and
let g : Rm → R be the function g(x) = 〈1,x〉. For any ∆ > 0, there exists a mapping from databases
D ⊆ X to vectors b(D) ∈ Rm such that:
1. The sensitivity of b(D) equals ∆, and
2. For any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1/2], if µ is an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism such that
Aµ(D) ≤ b(D) with probability 1, then
max {g(x) : Ax ≤ b(D)} − E[g(µ(D))] ≥ ∆
4
· inf
p≥1
{
αp,1(A)
p
√
m
} · ln(e − 1
2δ
+ 1
)
.
Since the objective function g is 1-Lipschitz under the `1-norm, this lower bound matches the
upper bound from Theorem 3.6 up to a factor of O(logm).
Proof of Theorem 3.9. For ease of notation, let t = 1 ln
(
e−1
2δ + 1
)
. Notice that δ ≤ 12 implies
t ≥ 1. For each vector d ∈ Zm, let Dd be a database where for any d,d′ ∈ Zm, Dd and Dd′ are
neighboring if and only if ‖d− d′‖1 ≤ 1. Let b (Dd) = ∆d and let a1, . . . , am > 0 be the diagonal
entries of A. Since Aµ (Dd) ≤ b (Dd) with probability 1, µ (Dd) must be coordinate-wise smaller
than ∆
(
d1
a1
, . . . , dmam
)
.
For each index i ∈ [m], let S0i be the set of vectors x ∈ Rm whose ith components are smaller
than ∆ai (di − btc):
S0i =
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≤ ∆
ai
(di − btc)
}
.
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Similarly, let
S1i =
{
x ∈ Rm : ∆
ai
(di − btc) < xi ≤ ∆di
ai
}
.
For any vector I ∈ {0, 1}m, let SI = ×mi=1SIii . The sets SI partition the support of µ (Dd) into
rectangles. Therefore, by the law of total expectation,
E [g (µ (Dd))] =
∑
I∈{0,1}m
E [g (µ (Dd)) | µ (Dd) ∈ SI ] Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ SI ] . (6)
Suppose that µ (Dd) ∈ SI for some I ∈ {0, 1}m. If Ii = 0, then we know that µ (Dd)i ≤
∆
ai
(di − btc). Meanwhile, if Ii = 1, then µ (Dd)i ≤ ∆diai since Aµ (Dd) ≤ b (Dd) with probabil-
ity 1. Since g(x) = 〈1,x〉, we have that for each I ∈ {0, 1}m,
E [g (µ (Dd)) | µ (Dd) ∈ SI ] ≤
m∑
i=1
∆ (di − btc)
ai
1{Ii=0} +
∆di
ai
1{Ii=1} =
m∑
i=1
∆di
ai
− ∆btc
ai
1{Ii=0}.
Combining this inequality with Equation (6) and rearranging terms, we have that
E [g (µ (Dd))] ≤ ∆
m∑
i=1
di
ai
−
∑
I∈{0,1}m
m∑
i=1
∆btc
ai
1{Ii=0} Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ SI ]
= ∆
m∑
i=1
di
ai
−∆btc
m∑
i=1
1
ai
∑
I∈{0,1}m
1{Ii=0} Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ SI ] .
For any i ∈ [m], ∑I∈{0,1}m 1{Ii=0} Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ SI ] = Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ S0i ] . Therefore,
E [g (µ (Dd))] ≤ ∆
m∑
i=1
di
ai
−∆btc
m∑
i=1
1
ai
Pr
[
µ (Dd) ∈ S0i
]
. (7)
We now prove that for every index i ∈ [m], Pr [µ (Dd) ∈ S0i ] > 12 . This proof relies on the
following claim.
Claim 3.10. For any index i ∈ [m], vector d¯ ∈ Zm, and integer j ≥ 1, let Sd¯,i,j be the set of all
vectors x ∈ Rm whose ith component is in the interval
(
∆(d¯i−j)
ai
, ∆d¯iai
]
:
Sd¯,i,j =
{
x ∈ Rm : ∆(d¯i − j)
ai
< xi ≤ ∆d¯i
ai
}
.
Then Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j
] ≤ δ∑j−1`=0 e`.
Notice that Sd,i,btc = S1i , a fact that will allow us to prove that Pr
[
µ (Dd) ∈ S0i
]
> 12 .
Proof of Claim 3.10. We prove this claim by induction on j.
Base case (j = 1). Fix an arbitrary index i ∈ [m] and vector d¯ ∈ Zm. Let ei ∈ {0, 1}m be
the standard basis vector with a 1 in the ith component and 0 in every other component. Since
b
(
Dd¯−ei
)
= ∆
(
d¯− ei
)
, we know the probability that µ
(
Dd¯−ei
)
i
>
∆(d¯i−1)
ai
is zero. In other
words,
Pr
[
µ
(
Dd¯−ei
) ∈ Sd¯,i,1] = 0. (8)
Since Dd¯ and Dd¯−ei are neighboring, this means that
Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,1
] ≤ e Pr [µ (Dd¯−ei) ∈ Sd¯,i,1]+ δ = δ.
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Inductive step. Fix an arbitrary j ≥ 1 and suppose that for all indices i ∈ [m] and vectors
d¯ ∈ Zm, Pr [µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j] ≤ δ∑j−1`=0 e`. We want to prove that for all indices i ∈ [m] and vectors
d¯ ∈ Zm, Pr [µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1] ≤ δ∑j`=0 e`. To this end, fix an arbitrary index i ∈ [m] and vector
d¯ ∈ Zm. By the inductive hypothesis, we know that
Pr
[
µ
(
Dd¯−ei
) ∈ Sd¯−ei,i,j] ≤ δ j−1∑
`=0
e`. (9)
Note that
Sd¯,i,j+1 =
{
x :
∆
(
d¯i − j − 1
)
ai
< xi ≤ ∆d¯i
ai
}
=
{
x :
∆
(
d¯i − j − 1
)
ai
< xi ≤ ∆(d¯i − 1)
ai
}
∪
{
x :
∆
(
d¯i − 1
)
ai
< xi ≤ ∆d¯i
ai
}
= Sd¯−ei,i,j ∪ Sd¯,i,1.
We can now use this fact, the definition of differential privacy, and Equation (9), to prove the
inductive hypothesis holds. By the definition of differential privacy,
Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1
] ≤ e Pr [µ (Dd¯−ei) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1]+ δ.
Since Sd¯,i,j+1 = Sd¯−ei,i,j ∪ Sd¯,i,1, we have that
Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1
] ≤ e (Pr [µ (Dd¯−ei) ∈ Sd¯−ei,i,j]+ Pr [µ (Dd¯−ei) ∈ Sd¯,i,1])+ δ.
By Equation (8), we know that Pr
[
µ
(
Dd¯−ei
) ∈ Sd¯,i,1] = 0, so
Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1
] ≤ e Pr [µ (Dd¯−ei) ∈ Sd¯−ei,i,j]+ δ.
Finally, by the inductive hypothesis (Equation (9)),
Pr
[
µ (Dd¯) ∈ Sd¯,i,j+1
] ≤ eδ j−1∑
`=0
e` + δ = δ
j∑
`=0
e`,
so the inductive hypothesis holds.
Since Sd,i,btc = S1i , our careful choice of the value t allows us to prove that for every index i,
Pr
[
µ (Dd) ∈ S0i
]
> 12 (see Claim A.4 in Appendix A). This inequality, Equation (7), and the fact
that t ≥ 1 together imply that
E [g (µ (Dd))] < ∆
m∑
i=1
di
ai
− ∆btc
2
m∑
i=1
1
ai
≤ ∆
m∑
i=1
di
ai
− ∆t
4
m∑
i=1
1
ai
.
Since max {g(x) : Ax ≤ b (Dd)} = max
{
〈1,x〉 : x ≤ ∆
(
d1
a1
, . . . , dmam
)}
= ∆
∑m
i=1
di
ai
, we have that
max {g(x) : Ax ≤ b (Dd)} − E [g (µ (Dd))] ≥ ∆
4
(
m∑
i=1
1
ai
)
ln
(
e − 1
2δ
+ 1
)
.
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We now prove that infp≥1 αp,1(A) p
√
m ≤ α∞,1(A) =
∑m
i=1
1
ai
, which proves the theorem state-
ment. Since A is diagonal, α∞,1(A) = supu≥0 {‖u‖1 : uiai ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [m]} =
∑m
i=1
1
ai
. Moreover,
since ∞
√
m = 1, α∞,1(A) ∈ {αp,1(A) p
√
m : p ≥ 1}, which implies that infp≥1 αp,1(A) p
√
m ≤ α∞,1(A).
Therefore,
max {g(x) : Ax ≤ b(Di)} − E[g(µ(D))] ≥ ∆
4
· inf
p≥1
{
αp,1(A)
p
√
m
} · ln(e − 1
2δ
+ 1
)
,
as claimed.
This theorem demonstrates that our algorithm’s loss (Theorem 3.6) is tight up to a factor of
O(logm) among all differentially private mechanisms.
4 Characterization of (, 0)-differentially private mechanisms
In Section 3 we presented a nearly optimal (, δ)-DP mechanism for private optimization. The
optimal (, 0)-DP mechanism for this problem is considerably easier to characterize.
Theorem 4.1. Let S∗ =
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} be the intersection of all feasible sets across all
databases D. If S∗ is nonempty, then the optimal (, 0)-differentially private mechanism outputs
argmaxx∈S∗g(x) with probability 1. If S∗ is empty, then no (, 0)-differentially private mechanism
exists.
Proof. Fix a mechanism, and let P (D) be the set of vectors x in the support of the mechanism’s
output given as input the database D. We claim that if the mechanism is (, 0)-differentially
private, then there exists a set P ∗ such that P (D) = P ∗ for all databases D. Suppose, for the
sake of a contradiction, that there exist databases D and D′ such that P (D) 6= P (D′). Let
D1, . . . , Dn be a sequence of databases such that D1 = D, Dn = D
′, and each pair of databases
Di and Di+1 are neighbors. Then there must exist a pair of neighboring databases Di and Di+1
such that P (Di) 6= P (Di+1), which contradicts the fact that the mechanism is (, 0)-differentially
private. Therefore, if the mechanism is (, 0)-differentially private, then to satisfy the feasibility
requirement, we must have that P ∗ ⊆ S∗. If S∗ is empty, then no such mechanism exists. If S∗ is
nonempty, then the optimal (, 0)-differentially private mechanism outputs argmaxx∈S∗g(x) with
probability 1.
5 Experiments
In this section, we present empirical evaluations of our algorithm in several settings: financial
portfolio optimization and internet advertising.
5.1 Portfolio optimization
Suppose a set of individuals pool their money to invest in a set of n assets over a period of time.
The amount contributed by each individual is private, except to the trusted investment manager.
Let b(D) be the total amount of money the investors (represented by a database D) contribute.
We let xi denote the amount of asset i held throughout the period, with xi in dollars, at the price
at the beginning of the period. We adopt the classic Markowitz [16] portfolio optimization model.
The return of each asset is represented by the random vector p ∈ Rn, which has known mean p¯
and covariance Σ. Therefore with portfolio x ∈ Rn, the return r is a (scalar) random variable with
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(a) n = 500 and rmin = 1.1 (b) n = 500 and rmin = 1.2 (c) n = 500 and rmin = 1.3
(d) n = 1000 and rmin = 2.2 (e) n = 1000 and rmin = 2.5 (f) n = 1000 and rmin = 2.7
(g) n = 1500 and rmin = 3.3 (h) n = 1500 and rmin = 3.8 (i) n = 1500 and rmin = 4.2
Figure 2: Quality in the portfolio optimization application for various choices of the number n of
investors and the minimum return rmin. These plots show the multiplicative increase in the objec-
tive function value of our algorithm’s solution—for various choices of  and δ—over the objective
function value of the optimal solution to the original optimization problem (Equation (10)). Darker
shading corresponds to lower values of  and hence stronger privacy. See Section 5.1 for details.
mean p¯ · x and variance x>Σx. The choice of a portfolio x involves a trade-off between the mean
of the return and its variance. Given a minimum return rmin, the goal is to solve the following
quadratic program while keeping the budget b(D) private:
minimize x>Σx
such that p¯ · x ≥ rmin
x · 1 ≤ b(D)
x ≥ 0.
(10)
We run experiments using data from stocks included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
compiled by Bruni et al. [3]. They collected weekly linear returns for 28 stocks over the course of
1363 weeks. The mean vector p¯ ∈ R28 is the average of these weekly returns and the covariance
matrix Σ ∈ R28×28 is the covariance of the weekly returns.
In Figure 2, we analyze the quality of our algorithm. First, we select the number of individuals
n to be a value in {500, 1000, 1500} (the number of investors is n = 500 in Figures 2a-2c, n = 1000
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in Figures 2d-2f, and n = 1500 in Figures 2g-2i). Then, we define each element of the database
(money given by individuals to an investor) as a draw from the uniform distribution between 0 and
1, so b(D) equals the sum of these n random variables. The sensitivity of b(D) is therefore ∆ = 1.
We set the minimum return rmin to be a value in [1, 5]. We calculate the objective value v
∗ ∈ R
of the optimal solution to Equation (10). Then, for δ ∈ [ 1
n2
, 0.002
]
and  ∈ [0.5, 2.5], we run our
algorithm 50 times and calculate the average objective value vˆ,δ ∈ R of the optimal solutions.
In Figure 2, we plot
vˆ,δ
v∗ , which shows that even strict values for the privacy parameters do
not lead to a significant degradation in the value of the objective function. For example, when
n = 1000 and rmin = 2.5 as in Figure 2e, setting  = 0.5 and δ = 2.5 · 10−4 increases the value
of the objective function by about 1%. Across the plots in Figure 2, we observe a relatively small
variance increase over optimal ranging from 0.0005% to 10%.
We find that there is a sweet spot for the parameter choices n and rmin. If rmin is too small,
the budget constraint is non-binding with or without privacy, so the variance increase over optimal
is always 1. We find this is true when n = 500 and rmin ≤ 1, when n = 1000 and rmin ≤ 2.1, and
when n = 1500 and rmin ≤ 3.2. This also explains why the variance increase over optimal improves
as rmin shrinks, as we can observe from Figure 2. Meanwhile, if rmin is too large, then the original
quadratic program (Equation (10)) is infeasible. We find this is true when n = 500 and rmin ≥ 1.4,
when n = 1000 and rmin ≥ 2.8, and when n = 1500 and rmin ≥ 4.3.
5.2 Internet advertising
Many internet publishers hire companies called supply-side platforms (SSPs) to manage their ad-
vertising inventory. A publisher using an SSP partitions its website’s pages into M groups, and
informs the SSP of the number nj of impressions (i.e., visiting users) available in each group j.
For example, an online newspaper might have a sports section, a fashion section, and so on. The
SSP relays the list of inventory groups to N potential advertisers, and each advertiser i responds
with the monetary amount cij ≥ 0 they are willing to pay per impression from each group j, and
also their budget b(D)i ≥ 0 for overall spending on the publisher’s website, where D represents
advertisers’ confidential business information, such as their financial health and strategic priorities.
The SSP then allocates xij impressions from each group j to each advertiser i so as to maximize the
publisher’s revenue while respecting both the impression supply constraints and advertiser budget
constraints:
maximize
∑
ij cijxij
such that
∑N
i=1 xij ≤ nj for j ∈ [M ]∑M
j=1 cijxij ≤ b(D)i for i ∈ [N ]
xij ≥ 0.
(11)
This linear program is similar to the transportation problem from Figure 1.
Existing algorithms for private optimization are not guaranteed to output a solution that sat-
isfies all the problem constraints, so we explore how often those algorithms violate the constraints
when applied to the advertising problem in Equation (11). The algorithm most closely related
to ours is by Hsu et al. [10], but our settings do not quite match: they require that the optimal
solution have constant norm across all possible private database. If this is not the case (and it is
not for our advertising problem), Hsu et al. [10] recommend normalizing the problem parameters
by the norm of the optimal non-private solution (which itself is a sensitive value). However, this
will necessarily impact the problem’s sensitivity parameter ∆, and Hsu et al. [10] do not provide
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Figure 3: Quality in the advertising application. Ratio of the revenue of our algorithm’s solution
and that of the baseline algorithm’s solution (circle markers, left vertical axis), and fraction of
constraints in the original optimization problem (Equation (11)) violated by the baseline algorithm
(triangle markers, right vertical axis). See Section 5.2 for details.
guidance on how to quantify this impact, though knowing this sensitivity is crucial for running the
algorithm.
Therefore, we compare our algorithm with an alternative baseline. We run experiments that
use two algorithms to transform each advertiser’s budget b(D)i in Equation (11) to a private
budget b¯(D)i. Both algorithms set b¯(D)i = max {b(D)i − s+ η, 0}, where s = ∆ ln
(
N(e−1)
δ + 1
)
for privacy parameters , δ and sensitivity parameter ∆, and η is a random variable. The first
algorithm follows our method described in Section 3 and draws η from the truncated Laplace
distribution with support [−s, s] and scale ∆ . The baseline algorithm instead draws η from the
Laplace distribution with scale ∆ , and thus is (, 0)-differentially private. Both algorithms use
noise distributions with roughly the same shape, but only our algorithm is guaranteed to satisfy
the original constraints.
Our experiments consist of simulations with parameters chosen to resemble real data from an
actual SSP. The publisher has M = 200 inventory groups, and there are N = 10 advertisers who
wish to purchase inventory on the publisher’s website. The amount cij each advertiser i is willing to
pay per impression from each group j is $0 with probability 0.2, and drawn uniformly from [$0, $1]
with probability 0.8. The number of impressions nj per group j is 10
6, and each advertiser’s budget
b(D)i is drawn uniformly from [$10
6 −∆/2, $106 + ∆/2], where ∆ = $102 is also the sensitivity of
the budgets with respect to the private database D. The results for various values of the privacy
parameter  (with the privacy parameter δ fixed at 0.01) are shown in Figure 3, where every data
point on the plot is the average of 200 simulations.
Figure 3 shows that, for small values of the privacy parameter , using the baseline algorithm
yields a large number of violated constraints, while using our algorithm violates no constraints and
incurs virtually no loss in revenue.
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6 Conclusion
We presented a new differentially private method for solving linearly-constrained optimization
problems, where the right-hand side of the constraints Ax ≤ b depends on private data, and
where the constraints must always be satisfied. We showed that our algorithm’s loss is tight up to
a factor of O(logm). Empirically, we used real and synthetic datasets to show that our algorithm
returns nearly optimal solutions in realistic settings. A natural direction for future research would
be to allow the matrix A to also depend on private data.
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A Omitted proofs from Section 3 about multi-dimensional opti-
mization
Claim 3.3. Let u be a vector in the intersection of the supports [b(D)−2s, b(D)]∩[b(D′)−2s, b(D′)].
Then fD(u) ≤ efD′(u).
Proof. Since u is a vector in the intersection of the support [b(D)− 2s, b(D)]∩ [b(D′)− 2s, b(D′)],
fD(u)
fD′(u)
=
m∏
i=1
exp (−|ui + s− b(D)i|/∆)
exp (−|ui + s− b(D′)i|/∆)
=
m∏
i=1
exp
(
 (|ui + s− b(D′)i| − |ui + s− b(D)i|)
∆
)
≤
m∏
i=1
exp
(
|b(D)i − b(D′)i|
∆
)
= exp
(

∑m
i=1 |b(D)i − b(D′)i|
∆
)
≤ exp
(
∆
∆
)
= e,
as claimed.
Lemma A.1. Suppose D and D′ are two neighboring databases with disjoint feasible regions:
{x : Ax ≤ b(D)} ∩ {x : Ax ≤ b(D′)} = ∅. There is no (, δ)-DP mechanism with δ < 1 that
satisfies the constraints with probability 1.
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Proof. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose µ : 2X → Rn is an (, δ)-DP mechanism with
δ < 1 that satisfies the constraints with probability 1. Let V = {x : Ax ≤ b(D)}. Since V ∩
{x : Ax ≤ b(D′)} = ∅, it must be that Pr[µ(D′) ∈ V ] = 0. This means that 1 = Pr[µ(D) ∈ V ] ≤
e Pr[µ(D′) ∈ V ] + δ = δ, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the lemma statement holds.
Lemma A.2. With probability 1, the optimization problem in Equation (3) is feasible.
Proof. By definition, the constraint vector b¯ is component-wise greater than the vector b∗ =
(b∗1, . . . , b∗m), where b∗i = infD⊆X b(D)i. Therefore,
{
x : Ax ≤ b¯(D)} ⊇ {x : Ax ≤ b∗}. By Lemma
A.3, we know that {x : Ax ≤ b∗} = ⋂D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} and by Assumption 3.1, we know
that
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} is nonempty. Therefore, the feasible set of the linear program in
Equation (3),
{
x : Ax ≤ b¯(D)}, is nonempty.
We now prove Lemma A.3, which we used in the proof of Lemma A.2. Lemma A.3 guarantees
that the (nonempty) intersection of the feasible regions across all databases is equal to the set of
all x such that Ax ≤ b∗.
Lemma A.3. The set
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} is equal to the set {x : Ax ≤ b∗}.
Proof. Suppose that x ∈ ⋂D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)}. We claim that Ax ≤ b∗. To see why, let ai be
the ith row of the matrix A. We know that for all datasets D ⊆ X , ai · x ≤ b(D)i. By definition
of the infimum, this means that ai · x ≤ infD⊆X b(D)i = b∗i . Therefore, Ax ≤ b∗.
Next, suppose Ax ≤ b∗. Then Ax ≤ b(D) for every database D, which means that x ∈⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)}. We conclude that
⋂
D⊆X {x : Ax ≤ b(D)} = {x : Ax ≤ b∗}.
Claim A.4. Let Dd and S
0
i be defined as in Theorem 3.9. Then Pr
[
µ(Dd) ∈ S0i
]
> 12 .
Proof. Let S1i and Sd,i,btc be defined as in Theorem 3.9. We prove that Pr
[
µ(Dd) ∈ Sd,i,btc
] ≤ 12 .
Since Sd,i,btc = S1i , this implies that Pr
[
µ(Dd) ∈ S0i
]
> 12 . This claim follows from the following
chain of inequalities, which themselves follow from Claim 3.10 and the fact that t = 1 log
(
e−1
2δ + 1
)
:
Pr
[
µ(Dd) ∈ Sd,i,btc
] ≤ δ btc−1∑
j=0
ej
=
δ
(
ebtc − 1)
e − 1
≤ δ (exp (t)− 1)
exp()− 1
=
δ
(
exp
(

(
1
 log
(
e−1
2δ + 1
)))− 1)
exp()− 1
=
δ
(
exp
(
log
(
e−1
2δ + 1
))− 1)
exp()− 1
=
δ
((
e−1
2δ + 1
)− 1)
exp()− 1
=
δ
(
e−1
2δ
)
exp()− 1
=
1
2
.
Therefore, Pr
[
µ(Dd) ∈ S0i
]
> 12 .
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